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The Archaeology of First World War U-boat Losses in the 
English Channel and its Impact on the Historical Record 
Innes McCartney 
This article examines how the archaeological record of 35 known U-boats sunk in the English 
Channel in the First World War compares with the assessment of U-boat destructions made by 
the Admiralty’s Antisubmarine Division (ASD) in 1919. Comparison of the two shows that 
only 48 per cent of the 37 assessments were correct. This divergence between the extant 
archaeology and the 1919 assessment was partly caused by over optimism at ASD regarding 
reported attacks. However, it is also observed that ASD’s own processes were on occasion 
overridden by a need to overstate Allied successes, and should be seen in the broader context of 
a wider range of inefficiencies that confronted the Naval Staff during the First World War. The 
same mistakes seem entirely absent from the Second World War records in the same geographical 
area. The research reveals that the radio silence observed by the Flanders flotilla proved a 
challenge to combating its U-boats at sea, making the tracking of the U-boats and the rerouting 
of Allied ships practically impossible. This was a factor in the early adoption of ‘controlled 
sailings’ in the Channel. It may have also been the driving factor behind the navy’s pressure to 
attack the Flanders bases by land in 1917, a key component often overlooked by historians. 
Key words: maritime heritage, Room 40, Naval History, Admiralty, First World War, Naval 
Intelligence, anti-submarine warfare, Royal Navy, U-boats, battle of Passchendaele, Naval 
Staff, Flanders flotilla 
On 6 June 1944 (D-day) a radio-based position-fixing system known as GEE was switched on to provide accurate navigational capability to the landings in 
Normandy. Ships using GEE and equipped with ASDIC had the additional benefit 
of being able to pinpoint the exact locations of shipwrecks in a repeatable manner. 
This meant that anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces did not waste time attacking 
wrecks when hunting U-boats that were entering the English Channel at that time. 
The lists of known wrecks compiled in 1944–5 became the basis for what is now 
the UK Hydrographic Office shipwreck database. Routine hydrographic surveys in 
the decades that followed greatly improved the quality of data and the number of 
shipwrecks located, so that by the 1970s the growing number of recreational divers 
had a ready-made list of wrecks to explore; among them were the U-boats. 
In 1997 the author began to collate an archaeological record of lost U-boats by 
systematically diving on and visually recording each submarine wreck known at that 
time. By then it had become apparent that the number and distribution of the wrecks 
were noticeably at variance with the published histories of U-boat losses. 
*      This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built 
upon in any way.
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Some examples of wartime sinkings yielded survivors, enabling both loss and 
identity to be confirmed, and these indeed were located where the published record 
placed them. However, alongside these cases were wrecks with no apparent 
relationship to the published record. These sites, termed ‘mystery cases’, were the 
most difficult to resolve. However, the process of identifying each mystery case was 
assisted by the fact that the builders of the U-boats provided crucial identifying data 
on the propellers. These data could be read in situ, providing an instant means of 
accurate identification, so long as the propellers were original and not substituted 
during the U-boat’s operational life. 
In some cases the propellers had previously been recovered and had to be traced. 
Figure 1 shows one of UB78’s propellers on display at the Deutsches Marine -
museum, Wilhelmshaven. UB78 is an example of a mystery case, identified by 
recreational divers in the area of the Dover minefield, but listed by the Admiralty in 
1919 as having been sunk off Cherbourg.1 
The 33 surviving First World War U-boat wrecks in the English Channel area 
represent the largest single group within the confirmed 87 U-boats present overall. 
Two additional First World War losses (UB26, which was salvaged, and UC61 which 
was blown up on a beach) were discounted as dive targets. Of the rest there are 31 
Second World War U-boat wrecks and a further 23 wrecks which represent 
surrendered U-boats from the First World War either sunk as targets, lost in tow or 
1 The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA): ADM 239/26, Reported destruction of 
submarines Aug. 1914 to Jan. 1919.
Figure 1 The Blohm & Voss shipyard inscription on one of the propellers of ‘UB78’, clearly 
denoting the U-boat on which it was fitted; nearly all U-boats from the First World War can be 
identified from such inscriptions. (Author’s photograph)
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dumped at sea during 1919–21. Some of the isolated cases from this group were 
examined to confirm their elimination as potential war losses, although the main 
documented dumping areas were not examined. The overall picture of U-boat 
wrecks as now known is shown in figure 2. 
The last U-boat wrecks to be uncovered by UK hydrographic survey were three 
on the north coast of Cornwall found in 2001. The final U-boat identifications made 
by the author took place in 2013 and there has been no pressing need carry out 
further work since. Only one known wartime loss (U672 from 1944) remains 
unfound, although some of the U-boats sunk in the 1921 dumping grounds await 
positive identification. The sites listed in parentheses are those not yet unquestionably 
identified to standards of the Admiralty’s Antisubmarine Division (ASD), as 
Figure 2 The locations of the 33 First World War U-boat wrecks still lying in the English 
Channel as seen against the total number of U-boats present. (Author’s drawing)
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described below. For example, the two First World War U-boat cases off Gris Nez 
are subject to a local diving ban in force in the shipping lane under which they lie. 
This is also the case for a UB/UC boat lying to the north-east of them. The other 
identifications in parentheses are more robust and are unlikely to substantively alter. 
Each wreck has been described in The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict, 
published in 2014.2 The fact that little has changed in the five years since publication 
shows that the overall archaeological record of U-boat wrecks in the English 
Channel seems now quite stable and only limited site-specific alterations are likely 
to occur in the future. 
Where archaeology and history diverge: the overall accuracy of the 1919 list 
The final edition of the ASD’s Reported Destruction of Submarines published in 
January 1919 (hereafter referred to as the ‘1919 list’) presented its appreciation of where 
all of the 178 U-boats lost in First World War were destroyed.3 In its original version, 
the 1919 list shows what ASD knew during wartime of the destruction of each U-boat. 
By comparing the 1919 list with the archaeological record as known today (the 
‘2018 list’), it was anticipated that the differences uncovered would help to open up a 
new area of research, which would highlight the challenges faced by ASD in 
prosecuting the anti-U-boat effort. It would also allow for an evaluation of its 
successes and failures. A series of maps in figures 3–5 illustrate the differences between 
the 1919 and 2018 lists. Figure 6 draws together the results into an overall picture. 
Figure 3 shows the cases where the two lists match. This shows the degree of 
convergence between the two datasets: the 1919 list states that 37 U-boats sunk in 
the English Channel. Of these cases, only 20 can be matched to the 2018 list and a 
further two cases (UC61 and UB26) are known to have been sunk and subsequently 
salvaged or dispersed. Thus, measured against its own list, ASD was 59 per cent 
accurate (22 cases out of 37) in assessing the correct fates of the U-boats destroyed in 
the Channel in First World War. 
More instructive from the research standpoint was the extent to which the two lists 
do not coalesce. The degree of divergence between the datasets is shown in two ways. 
First, there are cases where a U-boat was not actually sunk or a where a sunk U-boat 
was misidentified in the 1919 list. These cases are shown in figure 4. This represents 
the balance of 15 cases from the 37 that ASD listed as destroyed in the Channel, minus 
the matching 22 wrecks. In these 15 cases, only in two instances did ASD correctly 
assess that a U-boat had been destroyed, but even in these cases, it was unable to 
specifically identify it: ASD mistook U95 for U93 and UC51 for UB18. 
Of the 13 remaining cases where no U-boat wreck is present at the location given 
by ASD, it should be noted that two of the U-boats (UC66 and UB78) have been 
found elsewhere in the English Channel, as shown in figure 2. The actual fates of the 
other 11 are described in The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict.4 However, 
in all cases it is now clear that the assessments made in wartime were flawed in some 
way and that the true fates of each U-boat had been overlooked. When looking at the 
2 McCartney, The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict.
3 TNA: ADM 239/26. See McCartney, ‘Paying the Prize’, 40–57, for a description of how this 
list was compiled, and a summary table of the final list.
4 McCartney, The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict, 135–6. 
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overall accuracy of ASD’s work, it could be argued that actual identity was not 
important to them, so long as it was known that the U-boat was destroyed. 
Therefore, adding the two misidentified losses to the 22 correct cases brings the 
overall accuracy rate up to 65 per cent (24 cases out of 37). Nevertheless, this is still 
far from an accurate picture of events, even when ASD’s performance is measured 
only against the baseline of its own list. The presence of an additional 11 mystery 
sites in the 2018 list reduces the accuracy yet further, as shown in figure 5. 
Adding the 22 known wrecks, the pair of salvaged cases and the 11 mystery sites 
brings the total of verified U-boat wrecks in the 2018 list to 35. Drawing these together 
with the 13 incorrect assessments leads to the final map shown in figure 6. It reveals 
that there are a total of 48 data points (i.e. alleged plus actual sinking sites). In order to 
Figure 3 The 22 U-boat wrecks in the English Channel that match cases published in the 1919 
list. (Author’s drawing)
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derive an overall accuracy rate it was important not to double count fates, so UC66 
and UB78 are only counted once, this brings the total number of cases to 46, of which, 
as shown in figure 3, only 22 were correct. This leads to an overall accuracy rate of 48 
per cent. Therefore, in the English Channel, despite its best efforts, ASD was only able 
to accurately pinpoint the destruction of U-boats in less than half of the cases known 
today. This was one of the more surprising outcomes of the years of diving and 
recording the wreck sites, and the rest of this article will examine its implications. 
The means of destruction 
The 2018 list shows how the U-boats in the channel were actually destroyed, as 
Figure 4 The 15 cases where the 1919 list does not conform to the archaeological record. In two 
of these cases, ASD correctly identified that a U-boat had been destroyed, but misidentified it. 
(Author’s drawing)
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opposed to what the assessors believed in 1919. Both the 1919 list and the similar 
list covering Second World War U-boat losses, the 1946 list,5 both share a 
common fault in the fact that the compilers of both lists attempted to find within 
their own records explanations for the loss of every U-boat. They did not take 
into consideration the possibility of losses which would not have been witnessed, 
such as diving accidents and U-boats striking mines. 
A pair of pie charts in figure 7 depict the differences between the 1919 and 2018 
5 TNA: ADM 199/1789, Director of Torpedo, Antisubmarine and Mine Warfare Division: U-
boats sunk or damaged and US Fleet Antisubmarine Bulletins.
Figure 5 The 11 mystery U-boats in the Channel area which bear no relation to the 1919 list 
fundamentally affecting its accuracy and raising questions as to why these losses seemingly went 
unnoticed. (Author’s drawing)
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lists when looking specifically at the means of destruction. Immediately noticeable is 
the increased proportion of U-boats destroyed by mines, represented by there being 
two more U-boats lost in the Dover barrage than the 1919 list described. The 
numbers of U-boats actually destroyed by depth-charges, ramming and Q-ships are 
reduced, and the losses by unknown cause increases from zero to 11 per cent, 
accounted for by the fact that there is no currently known explanation for the loss of 
four of the mystery U-boat wrecks. 
The English Channel is atypical as a theatre of U-boat operations. The presence of 
the Dover minefield leads to a higher rate of loss to mines than elsewhere: in 1973 the 
Admiralty calculated that overall around 30 per cent of U-boats sunk in the First 
Figure 6 The overall picture of U-boat losses in the Channel in First World War shows that there 
are 22 correct cases, 11 mystery sites, 11 incorrect cases and 2 misidentified cases. The 1919 list is 
only 48 per cent correct. (Author’s drawing)
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World War were mined.6 Additional U-boat wrecks found in minefields elsewhere in 
recent years, such as the Northern Barrage, leads to slight adjustment upwards of 
this figure, but the overall impact is not anticipated to reach the 44 per cent seen in 
the English Channel. 
Flaws in the system: errors made by the ASD in assessing U-boat losses 
The ASD was founded in November 1916 under the command of Rear-Admiral Duff. 
Its formation was one of a number of initiatives that coincided with the appointment 
of Admiral Jellicoe as First Sea Lord and was a direct response to the anticipated 
outright attack on shipping by the U-boats, which began in February 1917. ASD’s 
role was to coordinate all efforts aimed at defeating this threat, including assessing 
how the U-boats were being destroyed. In May 1917 reforms within the Admiralty 
War Staff (now called the Naval Staff) led to Room 40 (now called ID25) being 
brought within the Naval Intelligence Division (NID). This allowed for closer 
working arrangements with the Direction Finding (DF) and Convoy and Tracking 
sections, leading to a precursor of the Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) of the 
Second World War.7 
Reports and digests by the Naval Staff, NID and ASD, written from mid-1917 
onwards, clearly show that data compiled earlier in the war was reworked into a 
format consistent with new work. Thus, the 1919 list presents all ASW incidents from 
1914 onwards as subject to a common assessment procedure and format. The 
6 Naval Historical Branch, Portsmouth (hereafter NHB), Ministry of Defence, Directorate of 
Naval Warfare, 1973. British Mining Operations 1939–1945, vol. 1. Naval Staff History BR1736 
(56) (1), 41.
7 Beesly, Room 40, 173–7.
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Figure 7 The actual means of destruction of the U-boats compared to the estimations made by 
ASD in the 1919 list; minefields produced even better results than originally presumed. (Author’s 
drawings)
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assessment procedure itself was described in the Technical History Section of the 
Admiralty’s (THSA) history of ASD. 
Every engagement reported came under one of five headings. If considered to be 
of no value it was recorded as . . . ‘Not classified’. If the submarine was 
considered to have been ‘Possibly slightly damaged’ the successful result was 
regarded as ‘Improbable’; if ‘Probably seriously damaged’, ‘Possible’; and if 
‘Probably sunk’, ‘Probable’. Where the destruction was definitely established, the 
result was logged as ‘Known’. As experience showed . . . the classifications 
arrived at were often regarded in the Fleet, and by the persons most intimately 
concerned, as being unduly pessimistic.8 
The classification of losses as described was still in use, with minor changes in 
definition, in 1945. A letter grade was added to each heading; so that ‘Known’ was ‘A’, 
‘Probable’ was ‘B’, ‘Possible’ was ‘C’, ‘Improbable’ was ‘D’ and ‘Not Classified’ was 
‘E’. Therefore, every U-boat destroyed in both world wars was subject to these 
assessment criteria. Some insight into the actual working of decision-making process 
was also given in the technical history. 
The classification of the result of any engagement other than a ‘Certainty’ was 
extremely difficult, and conclusions were only definitely arrived at after a studied 
survey of each case, taking into consideration former and subsequent enemy 
movements in the vicinity, in conjunction with the knowledge possessed of the 
numbers and disposition of the submarines out at the time. For instance, a most 
helpful case was discountenanced by the fact that trustworthy intelligence gave 
one submarine only in the vicinity, and yet enemy activity continued after the 
attack in the same area. It was well known too, that the enemy put into practice 
various ruses – such as discharging oil into the water – to mislead and upset the 
calculations of the attacking vessel.9 
This paragraph is revealing because it shows that in practice the assessors 
struggled to judge with accuracy anything other than a certain ‘A’ grade kill. It also 
shows that the assessors had access to ‘trustworthy intelligence’ from NID on the 
actual disposition of U-boats as derived, from ID25, DF and the Tracking section. 
The original assessments made in each case survive in the quarterly editions of ASD’s 
Submarine Losses Return.10 However, when the 1919 list was published, all the losses 
were considered ‘A’ – known sunk. Table 1 shows the losses as originally assessed in 
the returns. 
As table 1 shows, it is quite clear that in at least ten of the 46 cases shown in figure 
6, ASD carried out assessments into the losses of the U-boats in disregard to its own 
published processes. Cases where the process was seemingly not followed are shown 
in bold and, in these cases, the letter in brackets is the author’s assessment of the 
classification that should have been given at the time, based on ASDs own rules. 
There was a survivor from UB56, identifying the U-boat, so it should certainly 
8 NHB, Technical History Section Admiralty, 1919. The Antisubmarine Division of the Naval 
Staff Dec. 1916–Nov. 1918. CB1515 (7), 6.
9 Ibid.
10 CB01292 in TNA: ADM 239/26
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have been classified ‘A’; Admiralty divers also searched the wreck in 1918.11 There 
was, however, no evidential basis in the returns for the grading given in the cases of 
UB37, UC46 and UB31, as no survivors or verifiable surface evidence was found. 
Far more surprising are the six inaccurate cases where quite clearly, the ‘A’, 
known sunk, attribution should not have been made. The two cases marked with an 
asterisk are the pair shown in figure 4 as having been misidentified when sunk. The 
evidence was only circumstantial, and ‘B’ would have been a better assessment. Three 
other cases were made solely on oil being present in the water and so by its own 
criteria, these ‘A’ classifications should not have been made. They are particularly 
notable when taking into consideration that, as previously noted, ASD considered 
that the presence of oil could be a ruse. Consequently, these cases are worth 
examining in more detail. 
UB78. The assertion that it was sunk on 9 May 1918 by ramming off 
Cherbourg,12 which only produced an oil patch, was made based on 
interrogations from survivors of other U-boats which stated UB78 had not 
returned from a patrol.13 Thus, in fact all that was known was that the U-boat 
had disappeared somewhere. The wreck was found in the Dover minefield in the 
1980s by recreational divers. 
UC77. The assertion that this U-boat was destroyed on 10 July 1918 by depth-
charges,14 producing oil, was, according to the Room 40 History Sheet for the 
boat,15 based on no intelligence whatsoever. Nothing of the U-boat’s movements 
was known at the time. In fact, UC77 was in harbour on the 10th, and only 
sailed the following day.16 
U109. This U-boat was listed as mined in the Dover Barrage on 26 January 
1918.17 There was no evidence aside from the fact that a U-boat was seen on the 
surface and oil was seen after an explosion to support this claim. 
Finally, the case of UC79 raises a number of important points. The attack in the 
southern North Sea by the submarine HMS E45 on 19 October 1917, credited in the 
1919 list with sinking this U-boat, was based on the evidence of only ‘a great 
upheaval of water’.18 However, it is interesting to note that, from the Room 40 
History Sheet for UC79, it had sent a radio transmission, fixed by DF at a position 
close to E45’s attack,19 which must have been the reason for attributing its 
destruction to E45, although this is not actually stated by ASD. 
Problematically for ASD, Room 40 was still collecting operational intelligence on 
11 McCartney ‘The “Tin Openers” ’, 22
12 TNA: ADM 239/26.
13 TNA: ADM 137/3917, Original history sheets of UB type German submarines, 
UB74–UB155.
14 TNA: ADM 239/26.
15 TNA: ADM 137/3918, Original history sheets of UC type German submarines, 
UC1–UC105.
16 Spindler, Der Handelskrieg mit U-Booten, vol. 5, 103.
17 TNA: ADM 239/26.
18 Ibid.
19 TNA: ADM 137/3918.
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it until it disappeared in the spring of 1918. A wreck found by Admiralty divers in 
August in the Dover minefield was identified as UC79,20 but no attempt was made to 
correct the Returns and ‘resurrect’ the U-boat. It had been declared dead in October 
1917 and ASD simply ignored any evidence to the contrary. As the Room 40 
intelligence offer William F. Clarke later recalled, 
The Anti-Submarine Division . . . had frequently to boost their own efforts, 
insisted on the success of many attacks that we in Room 40 knew to have been 
abortive and many officers had received decorations in consequence.21 
In the light of this observation, the attribution of ‘A’ grade cases such as UB78, 
UC77, U109 and UC79 are seen as much as poor staff work as attempts by ASD to 
‘boost their own efforts’; to demonstrate a degree of efficiency, which was in fact 
greater than it was achieving in wartime. The desire to demonstrate efficiency was 
not limited simply to ASD. 
20 McCartney, The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict, 73–5.
21 TNA: HW 3/16, W. F. Clarke, History of GCCS and its Naval Section, 1919–1945.
Table 1 The grading made for each U-boat destroyed according to the 1919 list  
Accurate             Letter                     Survivors?     Inaccurate          Letter                    Survivors? 
losses                   grade                                             losses                   grade 
U8                       A                            Yes                 UC19                 B                             No 
UB26                  A                            Yes                 U85                     B                             No 
UB19                  A                            Yes                 UB39                  B                             No 
UB37                  A (B)                      No                 (UC66)               B                             No 
UC46                 A (B)                      No                 UB32                  B                             No 
UC26                 A                            Yes                 UC16                 B                             No 
UC61                 A                            Yes                 UC51                 A (B)*                    No 
UC65                 A                            Yes                 (U95)                  A (B)*                    No 
UB81                  A                            Yes                 U109                   A (C)                      No 
UC69                 Not listed              Yes                 UC50                 B                             No 
UB56                  B (A)                      Yes                 UB17                  B                             No 
UB35                  A                            Yes                 UB78                  A (C)                      No 
UB38                  B                            No                 UC78                 B                             No 
UB58                  A                            No                 UC77                 A (C)                      No 
UB33                  A                            No                 UB103                Unclassified           No 
UB55                  A                            Yes                 U37                     not listed                No 
(UB31)               B (C)                      No                 (U93)                  not listed                No 
U103                   A                            Yes                 (UC79)               A (C)                      No 
UB72                  A                            Yes                 UB65                  B                             No 
UB74                  A                            Yes                 (WW1 U-boat)  not listed                No 
UC64                 B                             No                 (UC72)               not listed               No 
UB109                A                            Yes                 (UB/UCII)        not listed                No 
                                                                                  (Submarine)       not listed                No 
                                                                                  (WW1 U-boat)  not listed                No 
 
The grades in brackets have been added by the author as the suggested grade which should have 
been given, based on the actual contemporary evidence 
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Tensions with the fleet 
As described in the history of ASD above, there was a tension between ASD’s 
assessment of losses and that of the Fleet.22 Evidence for this was uncovered during 
the research when a spatial database of ASW incidents was compiled in GIS from the 
quarterly returns of ASD,23 the diaries of the Dover Command,24 the records of the 
Admiralty Salvage section pertaining to diving on the U-boat wrecks,25 and the 
actual location of each line of mines at Dover.26 The results are shown in figure 8. 
Of particular note is the disparity between the ASW incidents recorded by ASD 
in its Returns when compared to the Dover Command. Where one would expect the 
Dover Command to have been reporting incidents directly to ASD, it seems as if in 
reality both were compiling separate records from differing sources. There is little 
correlation between the two and the reason why is difficult to explain, aside from the 
degree of rivalry that the ‘Technical History’ seems to suggest. 
For example, in his autobiography, Admiral Keyes claimed that a U-boat was 
destroyed at the location where the mystery UB78 lies.27 In this case, he seems to 
have been right (although he got the identity wrong) and ASD wrong. Nevertheless, 
this is not consistently the case and Keyes made mistakes. One of the more notable 
arose from the reports from Admiralty divers (presumably confused by bad 
underwater conditions) that there were two U-boats side by side at the location 
where only one (UB58) exists. Keyes paid out two sets of prize money, although 
ASD was not convinced. Poor record keeping was also seen in the records of the 
Admiralty divers: inexplicably, as shown in figure 8, they appear to have made dives 
on the wreck of UB55 in July and again in August 1918 without realizing it was the 
same wreck. 
Flaws in the system: conclusions 
It is axiomatic that duplication of effort, administrative overlaps, interdepartmental 
rivalry and fictitious statistics are unhelpful in the successful prosecution of 
industrial-based wars of attrition. Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence to show 
the Naval Staff struggled to address these challenges in 1917-18. For example, the 
industrialist Sir Eric Geddes, while Controller of the Navy, was deliberately supplied 
with made up statistics to work on.28 The Plans Division and ASD failed to 
cooperate in planning ASW strategy for 1918, both independently producing papers 
with no co-operation, leading Admiral Beatty to be ‘simply astonished that such a 
procedure should be possible’.29 It is therefore important to see the failures of 
process in the accurate recording of U-boat losses in the broader context of the wide 
range of processual and organizational challenges faced by the Naval Staff at this 
22 NHB, Technical History Section Admiralty, 1919. The Antisubmarine Division of the Naval 
Staff December 1916–November 1918. C.B.1515 (7), 6.
23 CB01292 in TNA: ADM 239/26.
24 TNA: ADM 137/2096, Dover Patrol Operations Packs, vol. 3, pack 46/3, and ADM 
137/2097, Dover Patrol Operations Packs, vol. 4, pack 46/3 continued.
25 TNA: ADM 116/1851, Salvage record no. 22, and TNA: ADM 116/1632, Salvage record no. 20.
26 Leith ‘History of British Minefields’.
27 Keyes, The Naval Memoirs, vol. 2, 260.
28 Grieves, Sir Eric Geddes, 41-2.
29 Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 5, 316.
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time, exacerbated by a shortage of trained staff officers. 
The temptation to overstate successes against U-boats re-emerged in March 1940. 
In this instance Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, publicly claimed that only 12 
U-boats remained in service, and in ‘an act of cruel injustice’ demanded the sacking 
of Captain A. G. Talbot, Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare (and head of the 
Assessment Committee) whose accurate statistics, based on the empirical 
methodology developed by ASD (and now followed in a non-arbitrary manner) 
revealed that 43 U-boats remained in service.30 This estimate was accurate and 
Churchill’s claims echo ASD’s boosting of its efforts in 1919. 
The research in to the 31 U-boats sunk in the English Channel during the Second 
World War shown in figure 2 followed the same methodology as was used to analyse 
the accuracy of the 1919 list. The results clearly show that there were no procedural 
anomalies in the assessments of U-boats sunk. In marked contrast with the 1919 list, 
all the cases assessed according to the rules means that that the ‘A’ Known Sunk cases 
are all provably correct. 
The Flanders flotilla and the road to Passchendaele 
There is no doubt that ASD relied as much as it could on signals intelligence derived 
from the radio transmissions from and to U-boats at sea. The U-boats that operated 
from the High Seas Fleet bases routinely used their radios and valuable intelligence 
30 Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, 94.
Figure 8 U-boat wrecks and incidents in the Dover Barrage, showing the disparity between the 
records of the Dover Command and ASD and the sites visited by the Special Section divers in 
1918. (Author’s drawing)
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flowed in via Room 40 and the DF Section as a result. It is important to observe that 
two of the U-boats destroyed in the Channel, UB72 and UC65, were sunk by British 
submarines vectored to the locations of the U-boats derived from DF.31 The problem 
in the English Channel was that radio-derived intelligence was otherwise practically 
non-existent. 
Table 2 shows the extent to which radio intelligence in the form of DF was 
available at the time a given U-boat was destroyed. It shows that in only five cases 
did DF play a role in the destruction of a U-boat. In every other case, aside from the 
misattribution of the loss of UC79 to HMS E45, previously described, the airwaves 
were dead and no signals intelligence was available. 
The primary reason for this intelligence blind spot in the English Channel was the 
Flanders flotilla. The flotilla was established in 1915 and its main area of operations 
was the southern North Sea, English Channel and Bay of Biscay. It operated small 
31 McCartney, The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict, 93–5, 100–1. 
Table 2 The extent of DF available on the movements of U-boats lost in the English 
Channel 
Accurate            Based                      DF at time    Inaccurate         Based                      DF at time
losses                                                  of loss             losses                                                  of loss 
U8                       Flanders                 No                 UC19                 Flanders                 No 
UB26                  Flanders                 No                 U85                     Germany               No 
UB19                  Flanders                 No                 UB39                  Flanders                 No 
UB37                  Flanders                 No                 (UC66)               Flanders                 No 
UC46                 Flanders                 No                 UB32                  Flanders                 No 
UC26                 Flanders                 No                 UC16                 Flanders                 No 
UC61                 Flanders                 No                 UC51                 Flanders                 No 
UC65                 Flanders                 Yes†               (U95)                  Germany               No 
UB81                  Flanders                 No                 U109                   Germany               No 
UC69                 Flanders                 No                 UC50                 Flanders                 No 
UB56                  Flanders                 No                 UB17                  Flanders                 No 
UB35                  Flanders                 Possibly        UB78                  Flanders                 No 
UB38                  Flanders                 No                 UC78                 Flanders                 No 
UB58                  Flanders                 No                 UC77                 Flanders                 No 
UB33                  Flanders                 No                 UB103                Flanders                 No 
UB55                  Flanders                 No                 U37                     Germany               No 
(UB31)               Flanders                 No                 (U93)                  Germany               No 
U103                   Germany               Yes§               (UC79)               Flanders                 No‡ 
UB72                  Germany               Yes†               UB65                  Germany               Yes* 
UB74                  Flanders                 No                 (WW1 U-boat)  N/A                       N/A 
UC64                 Flanders                 No                 (UC72)               Flanders                 No 
UB109                Flanders                 Yes¶               (UB/UCII)        N/A                       N/A 
                                                                                 (Submarine)       N/A                       N/A 
                                                                                 (WW1 U-boat)  N/A                       N/A 
 
* UB65 sent its last radio signal on 4 July and was lost six days later 
† Sunk as a direct result of DF intelligence 
‡ The wrong attribution to UC79’s destruction shows DF available at that time 
§ A radio message from U103 was picked up 48 hours before she was sunk 
¶ UB109 was on an experimental long-range patrol to the Azores 
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numbers of the UB-type coastal boats and the UC-type minelayers. From its outset, 
due to its operating from foreign soil it maintained radio silence, as described in the 
Room 40 history of the German navy, 
In somewhat marked contrast to their custom at the North Sea Bases the German 
authorities observed considerable secrecy as to naval movements on the Flanders 
coast. In particular, the greatest restrictions in the use of wireless were enforced. 
The Flanders boats when at sea were consistently silent and unlike their 
comrades of the Bight Flotillas, refrained from reporting their positions or the 
results of their cruises by wireless . . . The effect of this secrecy is to reduce the 
amount of first-hand evidence as regards details of cruises to within small limits 
while evidence of survivors or prisoners is only reliable to a less degree. Under 
these circumstances, it has seemed best to write the history of the flotilla in the 
form of a general review of submarine operations on the Flanders coast.32 
Owing to this maintenance of radio silence by boats from Flanders, often the first 
that was known of their movements was when ships began to disappear. In the 
confined waters of the English Channel, there was no possibility of routing vessels 
away from danger and there was little opportunity to attempt to chase them off 
without accurate data from DF. The early adoption of the convoy system in the 
English Channel, under the guise of ‘Controlled Sailings’ in February 1917, several 
months before the broader convoy system was adopted was, in part, a response to 
the apparently-unending losses of colliers to the U-boats of the Flanders flotilla. As 
table 3 shows, the losses in the last quarter of 1916 to the Flanders flotilla were 
particularly severe, with France heavily reliant on British coal.33 
The role radio silence played in the Flanders flotilla’s successes is often 
overlooked by historians. A modern detailed study of the relationship between the 
Royal Navy and Passchendaele appears not to mention it.34 Stephen Roskill also 
seems not to have recognized its significance, even in a strongly worded critique of 
the navy’s role in pressing for the 1917 Flanders land offensive. Writing in the RUSI 
Journal in 1959, he was critical of the navy’s pressure on the Army to bring about a 
land attack on the Flanders bases in 1917. He concluded that 
had we then possessed an Inter-Service planning authority, it is difficult to 
believe that the fallacies here discussed would not have been exposed in time to 
avoid what may be considered errors of some magnitude – the price of which 
was paid by the British Army.35 
Among the alleged fallacies he dismissed was the idea that any material benefit 
would derive from driving the U-boats out of Flanders, arguing that the flotilla could 
have operated from Germany with the same results.36 Clearly, this is not the case: such 
a move would have caused it to revert to High Seas Fleet radio practices, which would 
produce greater signals intelligence through decryption and DF, and have facilitated 
the tracking and active hunting of its boats and the rerouting of Allied ships. 
32 Birch and Clarke, ‘A Contribution to the History of German Naval Warfare’, 316–7.
33 Halpern, A Naval History of World War 1, 351–2.
34 Wiest, Passchendale and the Royal Navy.
35 Roskill, ‘The U-boat Campaign of 1917’, 442.
36 Ibid., 441.
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Roskill goes on to claim that, had the convoy system been promptly introduced, 
‘Jellicoe’s pessimistic prognostications made to the War Committee and Haig – that 
we would lose the war unless Ostend and Zeebrugge were captured – would surely 
never have been uttered’.37 He omits to mention that controlled sailings were already 
in place in the Channel when the attack on shipping of February 1917 got under way. 
As table 3 shows, the Flanders flotilla was sinking more ships in the first quarter of 
1917 than in the last quarter of 1916, despite the introduction of controlled sailings. 
One has to wonder what else the Admiralty could have done at that time. 
Roskill was selective in the statistics he chose to use.38 He claimed that the 
Flanders flotilla were responsible for a third of the losses in February to May 1917, 
based on Spindler’s summaries for the tonnages sunk for that period.39 Oddly, 
however, Roskill neglected the losses to U-boat mines and used only the tonnages of 
ships torpedoed. Table 3 shows the actual losses of ships through this period by all 
causes. It clearly shows that in fact the Flanders flotilla sank 549 ships, fully 46 per 
cent of the total, making them far more dangerous than Roskill may have presumed. 
As table 3 shows, during 1916–18, the Flanders flotilla sunk 48 per cent of the overall 
total of its efforts and those of the High Seas Fleet boats combined. 
In reality the early adoption of convoys in the English Channel could not on its 
own have stemmed the losses of ships caused by Flanders-based U-boats. Convoys 
could have no effect on U-boat minelaying operations and therefore could not be a 
general panacea. Rather, the evidence seems to show that there would have been a 
degree of material benefit by forcing the Flanders U-boats back to Germany, 
because increased radio use would have filled in a dangerous intelligence black hole. 
As shown by the cases of UB72 and UC65, a better intelligence picture of the U-
boats at sea gathered by radio intelligence could create a viable means of fighting 
back. It is though, only the present author’s theory that Jellicoe and his planners 
tacitly recognized this benefit when pushing for a land campaign to re-take the 
Flanders harbours. 
It is, of course, a moot point to debate what might have happened if the Flanders 
flotilla had been driven out of its bases, or whether the cost to the British army 
would have made it worthwhile. However, it should be pointed out that the equally 
unsuccessful Zeebrugge Raid of April 1918 sought to achieve what Passchendaele 
could not. Clearly the Flanders flotilla was regarded as major threat, and one that 
remained viable into the late summer of 1918. Controlled sailings and the belated 
completion of the Dover minefield could only partly ameliorate its destructive 
effects: greater radio intelligence offered the potential to do much more. 
Further archival research might be able to make a formal connection between the 
Flanders campaign planning and the Flanders flotilla’s radio silence. However, such 
was the secrecy at the Admiralty at the time, this might prove a fruitless search. 
Nevertheless, the decision of the Flanders flotilla’s commander, Korvettenkapitän 
Karl Bartenbach, to institute radio silence seems to have been one of the most 
unintentionally significant of the First World War. In strategic terms, the Flanders 
flotilla drew in vastly disproportionate resources dedicated to its eradication. 
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 440
39 Spindler, Der Handelskrieg mit U-Booten, vol. 4, 194.
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Conclusion 
The creation over 17 years of fieldwork of a detailed archaeological record of U-boat 
wrecks produced a spatial means by which it could be compared to the 1919 
appreciation of U-boats sunk. When tested against the actual U-boat wrecks, it was 
found to be only 48 per cent correct for the English Channel. It will be interesting to 
see how, when the archaeological record of lost U-boats in the broader northern 
theatre has been completed, the overall accuracy rate may change. The secretive 
practices of the Flanders flotilla in the English Channel probably contributed a 
stronger negative bias in this region. 
Comparing the 1919 and 2018 lists has exposed some of the errors made in 1919 
to greater scrutiny. It is now clear that wishful thinking and a desire to demonstrate 
success created a number of very unreliable U-boat loss assessments, which have 
now become baked into the ‘standard sources’ and repeated unquestioningly in 
many secondary works. This was not, however, the case in the Second World War 
where all assessments in the English Channel were made in observance of the rules. 
In both World Wars, the importance of radio intelligence in establishing the 
disposition of U-boats at sea was a crucial component in beating them. Of note is the 
fact that in 1945 the U-boats operated in the English Channel employed radio 
silence. The accuracy of the 1946 list fell to just 36 per cent during that time using the 
same methodology outlined in this article.40 
The recognition of the true danger posed by the Flanders flotilla’s institution of 
radio silence has been slow to emerge. This article has attempted to demonstrate its 
true significance. An article covering Second World War U-boat losses in the same 
geo graphic area using the same methodologies is being prepared for later publication. 
40 McCartney, The Maritime Archaeology of a Modern Conflict, 289–9.2.
Table 3 Ships sunk by the High Seas Fleet and Flanders flotilla U-boats by all causes 
1916–18 as compiled by the official German historian, Admiral Spindler 
                         1916                                    1917*                            1918 
                         HSF           Flanders           HSF           Flanders     HSF           Flanders 
January                                     16                    89                 82             51                 47 
February                                  28                  127               114             53                 33 
March                  21                 40                  154               179             53                 57 
April                    37                 26                  227               114             42                 39 
May                      17                   9                  129               142             62                 23 
June                        3                 14                  144                 96             34                 31 
July                      52                   7                  137                 74             33                 39 
August                 26                 22                    92                 63             41                 28 
September           43                 83                    54                 84             40                 21 
October               67                 66                    64                 58             26                   9 
November           32               101                    40                 54                                       
December            52               100                    61                 59                                       
Total                  350               512               1,229             1037           435               327 
                          
* Spindler did not produce monthly totals of ships sunk for 1917. The author is grateful to 
Michael Lowrey for deriving the figures from Spindler’s original data.
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